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1.1 The rationale of the Competition, Regulation and Development Research (CDRF) project is that mere 
adoption of competition and regulatory laws is necessary but not a sufficient condition for it to be part 
of the market reform agenda especially in developing countries. Implementation is equally important. 
The working of competition and regulatory regimes in developing countries shows that while good 
laws are being drafted, the intent gets diminished in their implementation due to peculiar political 
economy and governance constraints.  
 
1.2 Against this backdrop, CUTS International has undertaken a research programme entitled 
“Competition, Regulation and Development Research Forum (CDRF)”, to stimulate research and 
deliberations on competition and regulatory implementation issues in developing countries. 
 
1.3 The project was launched by CUTS in September 2006 with the resource support of the Department 
for International Development (DFID) and International Development Research Centre (IDRC). The 
project has the objective of undertaking focused research, and advocacy on political economy 
constraints in implementing effective competition and regulatory regimes in developing countries.  The 
project is carried out through a research cycle comprising of call for research abstracts, commissioning 
of research papers upon approval of research abstracts, reviewing and quality checking process, 
organising an international symposium to discuss the research papers and publication of research 
volume.   
 
1.4 This first research cycle has been organised on the theme ‘Institutional Issues covering Political Economy and 
Governance Constraints in Implementing Competition and Regulatory Regimes in the Developing World’. Following 
research areas are being considered in this cycle: 
 
• Identifying and Overcoming Political Economy and Governance Constraints to the Effective 
Implementation of Competition and Regulatory Laws. 
• Independence of Competition and Regulatory Agencies: Feasibility, Practicality, and Necessity. 
• What should be the Priorities of Competition and Regulatory Authorities? 
 
1.5 Several of the contributions have come from researchers based in developing countries and in this way 
the programme has provided a platform for developing country researchers to showcase their research 
and deliberate on political economy and governance constraints issues. The focus is on policy-oriented 
evidence-based research grounded on theoretical underpinnings. Furthermore, the research papers 
cover experiences of wide-range of developing countries and transition economies including Kenya, 
South Africa, Zambia, India, Brazil, Chile, Turkey, Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries, 
Malta, etc. 
 
1.6 The Research Symposium entitled “Political Economy Constraints in Regulatory Regimes in Developing 
Countries” on 22-24th March 2007 organised to deliberate on research findings that emerged in the 
first cycle. Research papers focusing on political economy and governance constraints that developing 
countries face in implementing their competition and regulatory regimes were discussed at the 
symposium. The symposium facilitated deliberations on the above issues and helped in identifying 
better solutions, suitable to the requirements of developing countries. The event was used to identify a 
research agenda from the perspectives of developing countries, which could be taken up in future. 
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The symposium provided an opportunity for the reflection of a wide range of views, and helped in 
identifying remaining shortcomings in the completed papers before they are finalised and subsequently 
published. 
 
1.7 This project provides an important platform for generating substantive knowledge for better 
implementation of competition and regulatory policies and laws in developing countries. The project 
will also provide an opportunity to test the various hypotheses concerning the implementation of 
competition and regulatory regimes in developing countries and analyse the various misconceptions 
that exist in these countries. 
 
II.  OUTCOME FROM THE 1st CYCLE 
2.1 While market friendly reforms have become common across almost all developing countries, so have 
market failures. In order to address these failures, a sound competition and regulatory policy needs to 
be put in place along with efficient enforcement mechanisms.   
• The first step is to design a sound and robust competition and regulatory policy that goes beyond 
being ‘business friendly’ to being ‘stakeholder friendly’.  It should explicitly recognize and 
incorporate consumer interests and unambiguously include advocacy as a tool for promoting 
awareness among consumers.  
• Institutional endowment is central to the design and success of regulatory framework, thus it is 
equally important to put in place appropriate institutional mechanisms for enforcement and review.  
• However, if competition law and policy is to yield all the envisaged benefits, political will and 
consensus for reform is necessary.  Changing the law by itself will not help.  
The government’s commitment to growth as a political objective, political maturity and overall political 
climate in a country matters. Competition policy outcomes and incentives for politicians are to be 
aligned properly so that adoption of competition/regulatory law gets a political buy-in. 
2.2 In addition, creating a culture of competition, and the simultaneous involvement of the consumers in 
the entire process to successfully leverage the advantages of market-based competition is essential. The 
reconciliation of the perceptions of various players is essential and developing countries should adopt 
competition/regulatory laws that are in accordance with their special characteristics and requirements. 
However, media can play an educative role to help create ‘competition culture’. But in countries where 
there is severe lack of understanding about the nuances of competition regimes, it may not be that 
effective. Competition Law can also be promoted as a safety valve to garner support from its most 
fierce opponents. 
 
2.3 It may be difficult to coordinate between the government’s objective of promoting public interest and 
regulatory authority’s objective of promoting efficient markets.  Here the issue remains that how to 
balance the trade-offs between efficiency and public interest objectives, which may not be specifically 
mentioned in the law. Regulatory authorities may not be able to do much in situations that call for 
change in government policy/rules.  In such cases the Authority has to differentiate between public 
interest and the vested interest and strike the right balance, and ensure that the best decision is taken. 
 
2.4 For small economies, institutional design should be rooted in the specificities of the local conditions. 
Adopting US or UK style governance structures are being questioned in smaller jurisdictions. One of 
the objectives of competition law is to promote competition.  But this may not be possible in small 
economies because of the limiting size of the market.  Therefore it is better to apply competition law in 
 5
a less stringent manner. Since, institutional indivisibilities and high fixed costs preclude adopting large 
country regulatory models, regional agreements are optimal as they allow sharing of the 5 Es i.e. 
Expertise, Evidence, Enforcement, Externalities and Education in the design of multifunctional or 
multinational institutional arrangements.  
 
2.5 There appears to be no correlation between development level and independence of regulatory 
agencies.  Independence is influenced by several historical factors and therefore, national and sectoral 
studies may reveal important characteristics of regulatory agencies. The tripod of independence 
(autonomy), expertise, and accountability is a sine qua non for the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
regulator in the larger interest of the consumers at large. Thus, while principles of independence, 
accountability and capacity are universally accepted by regulatory institutions, how they evolve in a 
particular jurisdiction, will to a large extent be determined by the genesis and the politics of that 
particular country.  The extent of restraints that are put on autonomy of regulators will also depend 
upon the larger environment of public opinion that exists in that country i.e. it is very country/culture 
specific. Thus the importation of ‘cookie cutter’ approach to institutional design for developing 
countries is subject to scepticism.    
 
2.6 There is a clear need to be cautious and make distinction between regulation and control and ensure 
that the former does not degenerate into the latter.  In this spirit, regulation should be the exception 
and not the rule. It may be a good idea to introduce competition law at the same time as market-
oriented reforms to avoid giving impression to the private sector that what the State has liberalised is 
now again being placed under State control.  
 
2.7 Another attribute of good regulation is accountability and transparency of the regulator and in this 
context the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) can be cited as example where certain standards of disclosure 
are prescribed. Similarly transparency laws, like the Right to Information Act (RTI) in India, might play 
an important role in enhancing transparency and therefore accountability of regulators and the process. 
It is also important to create a set of universally accepted standards for regulators across different 
sectors along the lines of Basel norms created by the Bank of International Settlements, an 
international organisation that fosters international monetary and financial cooperation and serves as a 
bank for central banks.  
 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
3.1 It is important to know, how agencies use or could use their discretion in the design of good rules.  
External constraints or commitments can foster good domestic policies, by providing guarantees 
against the reversal of current policies or lending credibility to promise of future returns.  Such pre-
commitments could help strike a balance between the reluctance to unleash competition immediately 
and the desire not to be held hostage to vested interests or weak domestic institutions.  While this line 
of inquiry is standard in the public choice literature, it would be interesting to extend and examine 
whether it could be useful in the ‘optimal’ design of regulatory regimes in developing countries. 
 
3.2 Another area of inquiry could be the ranking of policy options for developing countries and related to 
this is the additional question of what constitutes good policy advice.  Since ‘one size or type does not 
fit all’, the next logical step would be to attempt to find sets of policies that work under different 
contexts and cultures.  The underlying idea is not to develop policy options that are unique to each and 
every country, but to map broad set of policy options that have been known to work in a certain 
context and to investigate whether and to what extent these are scalable and replicable.    
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3.3 Analyses of deeper political economy issues, including the nature of entrenched vested interest is also 
important.  For this purpose empirical studies at the ground level/micro level can be taken up. It is 
equally important that future research should focus on probing the diverse pattern in evolution of the 
political economy of competition and regulatory regimes across select countries. 
  
3.4 Further, it is essential to focus further research on quality and efficiency aspects of regulation and 
regulatory regimes in developing countries.  Future work could inter alia address questions such as:  
 
• Do regulators do what they are supposed to do?  
• Whether what they are supposed to do is right?   
 
3.5 Perceived successes and failures could be studied as cases to learn from such experiences. The domain 
of regulatory outcomes also require further research i.e. whether the regulatory agencies are giving 
‘value for money’ or whether they are merely another bureaucratic process. 
 
 
IV. PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM 
4.1 Inaugural Session 
4.1.1 The two and a half day symposium began with a high profile opening session in which the 
speakers included Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi, Secretary General, UNCTAD; Dr. C. Rangarajan, 
Chairman, Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister of India; Dr Fredric Jenny, Judge 
French Supreme Court; Dr Nitin Desai, Former Under Secretary General, United Nations; Roger 
Nellist, DFID and Pradeep Mehta, CUTS. (Please see Annexure for their speeches/observations). 
This session highlighted the need for developing countries to create effective and distinctive 
institutional mechanisms for successfully implementing competition and regulatory policy.  While 
market friendly reforms have become common across almost all developing countries, so have 
market failures.  In order to address these failures, a sound competition and regulatory policy 
needs to be put in place along with efficient enforcement mechanisms.  This is however not an 
easy task at the best of times.  In certain developing countries the problem gets exacerbated as a 
result of weak institutional foundations. 
4.1.2 The first step is to design a sound and robust competition and regulatory policy that goes beyond 
being ‘business friendly’ to being stakeholder friendly.  It should explicitly recognize and 
incorporate consumer interests and unambiguously include advocacy as a tool for promoting 
awareness among consumers.  The session also stressed that the mere adoption of competition and 
regulatory laws is not sufficient.  It is equally important to put in place appropriate institutional 
mechanisms for enforcement and review.  For this, the value of ‘political will’ was underscored.  In 
addition, the speakers emphasized the importance of creating a culture of competition, and the 
simultaneous involvement of consumers in the entire process to successfully leverage the 
advantages of market based competition.  
  
4.2 Session I: “Political Economy Constraints in Competition and Regulatory Regimes and 
Constraints faced by Competition and Regulatory Agencies” 
 
4.2.1 The first technical session covered issues of “Political Economy Constraints in Competition and 
Regulatory Regimes and Constraints faced by Competition and Regulatory Agencies”.  In all three 
papers were presented. The objectives of enacting competition law were discussed and the 
 7
potential conflicts between promoting efficiency and public interest objectives were highlighted.  
There should exist political will to implement competition policy and law.  Competition policy is 
not neutral but economic competition can be used to further the aims of economic democracy.  
Political capture is likely, as evidence from even developed countries has shown.  But what matters 
is the institutional context.  In developed countries the coexistence of a sound institutional 
framework has helped in the implementation of competition policy.   
  
4.2.2 The paper from Zambia highlighted how a weak institutional structure can cramp the process.  
The Competition Act was adopted in 1994, even as the state retained control in certain key 
industries such as telecommunications.  These entities were exempted from the application of 
competition law thus obstructing the benefits of competition to become broad based.  The Indian 
paper showed that a peculiar application of the erstwhile competition law, the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTPA), had resulted in it degenerating into a ‘licensing law’.  
Combined with very little competition in and for the market, the consequence was predictable. 
Prices were high, quality was poor and the waiting lists huge as one would expect from unfettered 
monopolies.   Thus, when the new competition law was proposed it received immediate support 
from consumers, while businesses were ambivalent about it.  The previous experience with 
MRTPA and the risk of bureaucratic high handedness in its application (such as penalizing 
overproduction) needed to be addressed for businesses to buy in to the new proposal.  Eventually 
business supported the new competition law after concessions were made in the ‘Merger and 
Acquisitions’ provisions that raised the threshold for initiating an investigation.      
  
4.2.3 The discussion that followed focused on the ways of tackling the ‘tyranny of vested interests’ while 
enacting competition policy and law, especially in the developing country context.  It was pointed 
when economic vested interests dominate political power they also limit growth dynamics and 
curtail economic opportunities for poverty reduction in developing countries. Competition policy 
should be judged explicitly against its contribution to tackling ‘the tyranny of vested interests’ for 
poverty reduction outcomes. The issue with competition is that consumer are not organised while 
producers/sellers are organised to influence the policy makers. Thereby, competition benefits are 
often directed to well connected and entrenched. It was pointed out that vested interests among 
entrenched producer groups are not homogeneous and that the nexus between business and 
government may be difficult to break. Invoking the ‘public interest’ objective to deal with vested 
interests requires a precise definition of the former, including the trade off, if any, between public 
interest in the short run versus the long run.  Economies change only with pain and it is critical not 
to underestimate the role of the Social Order in this process.  The ‘rising tide lifts all boats’ 
paradigm works only with the existence of a social order that has a social security system in place 
and a large middle class.  Therefore the success of implementing competition law in most 
developing economies will depend upon how the gains are distributed, rather than on growth per 
se.       
  
4.2.4 Whether enactment of competition policy and law will result in growth and/or poverty reduction 
was a question that most agreed required an empirical basis.  If such a linkage exists it should be 
made explicit.  The example of Australia was given, where one of the stated objectives of 
competition law is to raise the welfare of Australians.  Therefore if competition policy and law is to 
be used as an instrument for poverty reduction, this should be enshrined in the law.  
  
4.2.5 On the other hand, the session generated a common understanding that competition policy and 
law would enhance opportunities for larger participation in the economy, of groups that had 
previously been disenfranchised.  In addition, the law would create a predictable regulatory 
environment for both producers and consumers.  The role of consumer advocacy and the media 
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were underscored as necessary allies/constituents to improve governance and create the right 
checks and balances in the system.  Media often plays an important role as a countervailing force 
against the nexus between government and business, though it can be compromised on occasions.  
In this context, the role consumer movement is vital.  Finally, if competition law and policy is to 
yield all the envisaged benefits, political will and consensus for reform is necessary.  Changing the 
law by itself will not help. 
  
4.3 Session II: Constraints faced by Competition and Regulatory Agencies 
 
4.3.1 It was recognized that regulatory agencies in developing countries may be susceptible to regulatory 
capture by the regulated industry, or to‚ political capture by the government. Four papers were 
presented in the session. The session discussed such constraints faced by regulatory authorities and 
explored appropriate strategies for regulators in the developing world.   
  
The session highlights: 
i) Enactment of the law is not enough; 
ii) Regulatory Authorities face several constraints in developing countries; 
iii) That ‘independence’ as a concept is hard to pin down;  
iv) There should be a clear division of powers between the Regulatory agency and the 
Competition Authority; and  
v) Regulatory Agencies in developing countries should have clearly defined strategic priorities. 
  
4.3.1 A survey of Competition Authorities across 21 developing countries highlighted the challenges 
faced by them.  These included low level of development, lack of expertise and financial resources, 
lack of transparency in appointment of staff to the agencies and lack of a culture of competition.  
In some cases, financial resources and lack of a legal framework were also impediments. Finally, 
the survey also showed that lack of clear jurisdiction between regulatory agencies leads to 
stakeholder uncertainty.  No clear solutions were advanced, but a recommendation to benchmark 
with international experience was made.  To minimize conflict between regulatory agencies, it was 
emphasized that the mandate needs to be clear and that formal communication mechanisms 
should be available between the agencies. The Turkish telecommunications experience 
demonstrated the advantages of this and further recommended that ex-ante regulation be entrusted 
to the sectoral regulator and ex-post competitive investigations to the jurisdiction of the 
Competition Authority.  This would serve to enhance the effectiveness of the institutions.  
  
4.3.2 With regard to independence of regulatory authorities, the recommendations were not clearly spelt 
out. The metaphor used to describe independence was quicksand; the more you try to be 
independent, the less likely it will happen in practice.  While that is debatable, independence does 
have two dimensions, ‘formal’ independence and ‘real’ independence.    The existing literature has 
focused on formal independence i.e. the ability of the regulatory authority to take decisions that are 
free from the interest of the agents.  Although it has been difficult to establish the effects of 
independence on the performance of the agencies or the sector, the hypothesis has been that there 
are benefits from the presence of this characteristic.   Thus measurement of independence is a 
valuable exercise. The paper on independence of regulatory authorities attempts to develop an 
independence indicator through a structured questionnaire across a sample of 117 countries.  The 
results are preliminary and show that the degree of independence varies across the sample, but the 
model does not capture what the authors had sought to capture at the outset, an indicator of ‘real’ 
independence.  Nevertheless the implication is that a more refined indicator could be developed 
that includes variables that capture not only formal but also ‘real’ independence.  The other 
interesting piece of evidence presented was that there appears to be no correlation between the 
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development levels of a country and independence of regulatory agencies.  Independence is 
influenced by several historical factors and therefore, national and sectoral studies may reveal 
important characteristics of regulatory agencies.  It was argued that accountability is the flip side of 
independence and accountability of agency is equally important. Independence without 
accountability would not work. 
  
4.3.3 In terms of effectiveness of Competition Authorities, especially young ones, the dilemma relates to 
the choice of nature and types of cases to address from the many that may be awaiting disposal.  
This choice will be determined by the goals the Authority has set for itself.  These could be either 
one or more of the following: 
  
a) to promote efficiency,  
b) to be well known; 
c) to be accepted;  
d) to be understood; or  
e) to maximize social impact.   
  
4.3.4 It is impossible for Competition Authorities to simultaneously handle all the anti competitive cases 
that come up for before them and prioritising them is not an easy task.  The Authorities could end 
up choosing cases that are important, but perhaps require more time, and therefore the trade off 
could be a long waiting list of cases. The choice depends upon the Authorities’ objective, but the 
vital message for young competition authorities is that this choice will have to be made. It was 
argued that Competition Authorities should focus on cases with strong public interest element so 
as to build the credibility of the agency, rather than focus on economic impacts. The paper from 
South Africa demonstrated that public interest objectives could not be ignored especially in their 
socio-economic context.  The new Competition Act of 1998 in South Africa articulates public 
interest objectives along side the goal of economic efficiency. Thus black empowerment and 
employment generation are development objectives incorporated in all policy initiatives, including 
competition law.   
  
4.3.5 The discussion that followed granted that independence is important in itself but that it might be 
difficult to capture empirically in a quantitative measure.  Nevertheless it is important to create a 
database of studies at national and sector levels in order to understand how regulatory agencies 
behave under different situations and contexts.  It was pointed out that prosecutorial discretion 
will always exist since complaints are going to be more and therefore the competition authority will 
need to strategise. In Brazil, a simple method based on expertise and evidence is adopted.  The 
choice naturally will differ across jurisdictions, and it was pointed out that the choice confronting 
an authority between tackling easy cases versus those with the most harmful impact would itself 
require scarce resources.  In addition, between the consumer advocacy role of the authority and 
enforcement, the consensus was to promote advocacy on priority.  It is important to create a 
culture of competition in the country.   Opinion on whether to use competition law and policy for 
public interest objectives was divided; one set of discussants preferring its use for promoting 
efficiency only, while suggesting that public interest concerns be addressed by other measures of 
policy.  The example of the US was given where enforcement of the law has been deliberately 
weakened to allow enterprises to compete on world markets.  This view did not however generate 






4.4 Session III: Efficiency and Effectiveness of Competition & Regulatory Agencies 
 
4.4.1 Several factors exist that have a varying degree of influence on the functioning of regulatory 
agencies in developing countries and affect their efficiency and effectiveness. This session dealt 
with such issues and identified appropriate measures to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of 
regulatory agencies. In all four papers were presented.   
 
4.4.2 Using data from Latin American countries with meaningful privatisation programmes in their main 
infrastructure sectors, the research suggests that quality of regulation matters. While this seems to 
be an accepted position, there is lack of empirical evidence in this regard.  Therefore one 
contribution of this research paper is to add to the scant empirical evidence available as of now on 
the benefits of sound institutional design for regulatory agencies.  In the paper, regulatory quality is 
proxied by legal solidity, financial strength and decision-making autonomy while outcomes are 
analysed on the basis of the role of regulation to align prices with cost, on its effect on productivity 
and on reducing renegotiating opportunities.  Another conclusion is that the impact of the 
regulator is stronger in weak governance environments.    
  
4.4.3 In infrastructure sectors, market failure is likely be pervasive and lasting.  Therefore in a sector 
such as water, regulation is essential if private participation exists.  The options include regulation 
by agency, regulation by contract or a hybrid model.  The existing theoretical literature has focused 
on the polar cases, while existing regulatory systems in several developing countries fall in between 
these two poles.  The paper uses four case studies from the water sector in four South East Asian 
countries to establish that welfare outcomes from public-private contracts are superior in the 
presence of a regulatory agency.  The conclusion is especially applicable when other institutional 
arrangements are not adequate to constrain opportunistic behaviour by parties to the contract.   
  
4.4.4 There has been a proliferation of competition policy and competition law regimes in developing 
countries in the 1990s. Building capacity of young antitrust institutions in developing countries is a 
means to improving policing capabilities against anti competitive conduct by entities.  Many 
countries have augmented their capacity with Technical Assistance (TA) from developed countries.  
Undoubtedly TA is necessary for countries that are financially constrained to establish credible 
regulatory regimes.  The paper uses responses from 38 competition agencies to identify factors that 
increase the effectiveness of TA and therefore the effectiveness of the recipient agency.  Timing of 
TA comes out to be a significant variable, as does the absorptive capacity of the recipient.  “Over 
involvement” of the donor is considered good for the objective at hand.  However a strong 
message remains that there are no ‘recipes for success’ and that each TA programme has to be 
designed keeping the unique issues and challenges in mind.   In the larger context, the paper 
reminds us that an effective competition law regime requires supportive institutions such as an 
independent judiciary, political will and effective enforcement.  
  
4.4.5 Effectiveness and efficiency of competition policy was estimated quantitatively using a two-step 
procedure.  The effectiveness of domestic enforcement is measured by the index assigned to each 
country by the World Economic Forum (WEF) Index and the effectiveness of the competition 
policy regime is established by a positive link between the WEF index and ratio of FDI to national 
income.       
  
4.4.6 The discussion that followed suggested that institutional design is fairly complex and idiosyncratic.  
Accordingly general conclusions are likely to be at a very high level of aggregation and therefore 
not useful in providing implementable recommendations.  In addition to statistical evidence 
presented during the session, use of anecdotes and experiences as a basis for better understanding 
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of the underlying issues was recommended.  In regard to TA, it was mentioned that it is most 
effective when set to the recipient’s needs and not to donor’s desires or donor standards.      
  
4.4.7 It was generally accepted that a well-managed regulatory system is going to be subject to intense 
criticism by most groups because of the trade offs it involves.  However, unless models that seek 
to measure regulatory effectiveness capture the consequences on variables that are most important 
to consumers i.e. price, quality of service and access, till then these models are not going to be 
attractive for the consumers.  Further, it is important to disengage the regulatory impact on market 
outcomes from the impact that other variables may have on that outcome.  For example, FDI that 
was chosen as an outcome variable in one study could be influenced by the competition regime but 
it is also likely to be influenced by the macroeconomic environment.   
  
4.4.8 On the efficiency of regulatory agencies, it was agreed that this is a difficult variable to estimate. 
Benchmarking could be a solution but it also suffers from a similar infirmity i.e. who should one 
benchmark with.  The session highlighted the need for further research in this area, especially the 
need to develop country and sector specific case studies that could provide lessons for the future. 
  
4.5 Session IV: Competition and Regulatory Regimes in Small Economies 
 
4.5.1 This session focused on institutional issues in implementing competition and regulatory regimes in 
small developing economies, where economies of scale make it difficult to finance and sustain 
several agencies. Implementing large country prescriptions for small developing countries may be 
counterproductive; other policy instruments could be considered complementary to establishing 
regulatory regimes. 
 
4.5.2 If the size of the market makes it inefficient to establish single sector or single country regulators, 
two possibilities exist. Either one could have a multi sector regulator in a small country like 
Barbados or a multinational, single sector regulator through regional cooperation arrangements as 
in the Caribbean. The other problem in a small economy is that the community is small and people 
know each other making it difficult to enforce the mandate of competition law.   
 
4.5.3 Both the papers presented in the session emphasized the regulatory endowment effect i.e. 
institutional design should be rooted in the specificities of the local conditions.   Adopting 
developed country style governance structures are being questioned in smaller jurisdictions. One of 
the objectives of competition law is to protect and promote competition.  But this may not be 
possible in small economies like Malta because of the small size of the market.  Therefore the 
proposal is to apply competition law in a less stringent manner, for example, while evaluating 
mergers and also use complementary instruments such as trade policy to promote competition in 
the local market. For the Caribbean, institutional indivisibilities and high fixed costs preclude 
adopting large country regulatory models.  In this situation, regional agreements are optimal since 
they allow sharing of the 5 Es i.e. Expertise, Evidence, Enforcement, Externalities and Education 
in the design of multifunctional or multinational institutional arrangements.  
 
4.5.4 The discussion that followed largely agreed with the conclusions advanced in the session that small 
developing countries need to craft regulatory institutions based on the situation that obtains in 
each context.  A suggestion was made to further examine the question whether size matters or 
whether it is the combination of size and isolation that matters.   
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4.6 Session V: Experiences from Different Countries 
4.6.1 The session discussed experiences of select developing countries in implementing competition and 
regulatory regimes and examined institutional issues in this context. The emphasis was on 
discussing peculiar economic and social problems the selected countries face and to identify 
appropriate lessons for effective implementation of competition and regulatory regimes in 
developing countries. An interesting question posed by the chair of the session was whether and 
how much latitude developing countries should have in designing their institutional architecture 
for competition.  This echoes the paradigm adopted in the WTO to give ‘Special and Differential 
Treatment’ to the developing countries.  It must be remembered that when countries like Canada, 
UK and the US adopted competition regimes, they too were evolving their economic governance 
regimes. 
 
4.6.2 The issues that country based studies brought out with respect to developing countries did not 
come as a surprise.  The concerns related to independence (autonomy), expertise and 
accountability of competition and regulatory authorities.  A deeper investigation of independence 
revealed concerns related to funding of regulatory agencies and their hiring (and firing) practices. 
The studies revealed how difficult it is for governments not to get involved in funding and in 
hiring decisions of regulatory agencies.  The Kenyan study highlighted the need for capacity 
building particularly in the area of enforcement and case handling.  The Indian example reinforced 
the view and also recommended that appointments to the Commission should be based on a 
collegial approach. It emphasized that the tripod of independence (autonomy), expertise, and 
accountability is a sine qua non for the effectiveness and efficiency of the regulator in the larger 
interest of the consumer and the public.  What was surprising, however, was that the paper from 
Belgium echoed similar concerns for developed countries and interestingly stated that as far as the 
institutional framework for regulation is concerned, Belgium is like a developing country.   
 
4.6.3 The key message from this session was that the while principles of independence, accountability 
and expertise are universally accepted by regulatory institutions, how they evolve in a particular 
jurisdiction will to a large extent be determined by the genius and the politics of that particular 
country.  The extent of restraints that are put on autonomy of regulators will also depend upon the 
larger environment of public opinion that exists in that country i.e. it is very country/culture 
specific.  The session brought out skepticism about the importation of ‘cookie cutter’ approach to 
institutional design for developing countries.   
  
4.7 Session VI: Sectoral Case Studies 
 
4.7.1 This session focused on discussions on constraints faced in introducing competition and 
implementing regulatory regimes in the following sectors: Electricity, Telecommunications and 
Financial Services.  All the issues that were discussed in the earlier sessions affecting the quality of 
regulation in developing countries were in fact confirmed by the sector studies.  Hiring practices 
and expertise, asymmetric information between the multiple stakeholders, accountability, weak 
institutional structure and political interference were documented in the sector case studies as 
important barriers to the creation of competitive markets.  The electricity sector posed the biggest 
challenge, largely due to the monopoly characteristics of the industry and the associated difficulties 
in introducing competition in the sector.  Another issue emphasized in the Electricity session, 
although germane to other sectors as well, was the distance between ‘regulators’ and the 
consumers.  It is crucial to know the nature of complaints and quality of service issues affecting the 
consumer for the regulator to do a good job.  Thus, the Consumer Affairs agencies and the 
Regulator would be advised to work closely on such matters. A related issue is the weak consumer 
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participation in the regulatory process.  Consumer Organizations are not well organized and or not 
well presented.  A regulator is more likely to succeed when it is pressured from all sides, rather 
than by only one side.  In the case of the latter, the regulator is most likely to be captured by the 
group, which is exerting the maximum pressure.  The solution lies in building the consumer 
movement and consumer advocacy to ensure that their interests are well articulated and presented 
before the authority.    
 
4.7.2 In the financial sector in India, the evolution of the mutual fund industry provides a lesson for the 
banking industry in promoting competition.  MFs have been successful because of the sound 
regulatory system established by the Securities & Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and if banking 
in India is to see increased competition, entry barriers must be reduced.  However, the efficiency 
objective of promoting entry has to be traded off against public interest concerns in the Banking 
sector.  These concerns relate to universal service i.e. rural banking and the overwhelming role of 
public sector in fulfilling this objective.     
 
4.7.3 In the telecom sector, the issues are similar to electricity in promoting competition, such as open 
access, mandatory provision of interconnection, unbundling of network elements etc. with the 
important distinction that technological progress in the telecom sector across the world has made 
it easier to camouflage regulatory failures than in electricity. 
 
4.7.4 Dr. Bimal Jalan, Governor, RBI delivered the key note address at the concluding session. He 
underscored the important distinction between regulation and control and hoped that the former 
does not degenerate into the latter.  In this spirit, his recommendation was that regulation should 
be the exception and not the rule.  Another attribute of good regulation is accountability and 
transparency of the regulator and in this context Dr. Jalan gave the example of RBI where certain 
standards of disclosure are prescribed for RBI. Similarly he appreciated the role that Right to 
Information Act (RTI) in India might play in enhancing transparency and therefore accountability 
of regulators and the process.  He also advised creation of a set of universally accepted standards 
for regulators across different sectors along the lines of Basel norms created by the Bank of 
International Settlements, an international organisation that fosters international monetary and 
financial cooperation and serves as a bank for central banks.  
  
4.8 Concluding Session 
 
4.8.1 A part of the concluding session was devoted to recommendations for future research.  While 
there was wide-ranging discussion of political economy constraints affecting the conduct of 
regulators, there was almost no discussion on how agencies use or could use their discretion in the 
design of good rules.  External constraints or commitments can foster good domestic policies, by 
providing guarantees against the reversal of current policies or lending credibility to promise of 
future returns.  Such pre-commitments could help strike a balance between the reluctance to 
unleash competition immediately and the desire not to be held hostage to vested interests or weak 
domestic industries.  While this line of inquiry is standard in the public choice literature, it would 
be interesting to extend and examine whether it could be useful in the ‘optimal’ design of 
regulatory agencies in developing countries.  
 
4.8.2 Another area of inquiry could be in the area of ranking of policy options for developing countries 
and related to this is the additional question of what constitutes good policy advice.  Since ‘one size 
or type does not fit all’ is a stated outcome of the symposium, the next logical step would be to 
attempt to find sets of policies that work under different contexts and cultures.  The underlying 
idea is not to develop policy options that are unique to each and every country, but to map broad 
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set of policy options that have been known to work in a certain contexts and to investigate 
whether and to what extent these are scalable and replicable.  The research should develop the idea 
generated in the symposium that country specificity matters and therefore customisation is 
necessary.  A useful analogy would be the business strategy of Dell Computers, which provides 
customized products to its clients based on certain ‘givens’. Dell does not and cannot supply a 
‘unique’ computer to each customer.   
 
4.9 Cross cutting Issues 
 
The cross cutting themes that emerged at the symposium were as follows: 
  
i) Political will is a necessary condition for establishing good competition regimes 
ii) Consumer advocacy and empowerment is crucial as it can provide countervailing force to 
existing producer interests  
iii) It is important to create a culture of competition 
iv) Developing countries context is different from developed countries and therefore 
customisation is necessary.   
 
4.10 The next step 
 
As a next step after the symposium, the authors of all the papers presented would review them 
taking into the account the discussion and comments they received at the symposium. The revised 
paper after editing will be collated in a research volume published by well-known publishing house. 
 
Policy briefs would also be prepared summarizing the key issues/research findings that emerged 
out of the research papers in the first cycle which would later be used for dissemination to generate 
awareness on these issues. 
 
 
4.11 Lessons Learnt 
 
• The information about the live internet webcast should have been advertise well before the 
symposium so that maximum number of interested audience could watch the proceedings live. 
• The sessions should have optimum number of panelsits/chairs/discussants so that they can speak 
or present their opinion efficiently. 
• There should be ample time for floor discussion and so that the sessions become more interactive. 









1. Roger Nellist, DFID 
UK Government participation at this event demonstrates the importance we attach to ‘fair competition’ 
and to ‘better regulation’, as part of the overall policy environment for delivering higher sustainable rates 
of inclusive growth and for poverty reduction.   
 
The private sector needs a good overall investment climate in which to operate. If the investment climate 
is poor, as it still is in many countries and in some states in India, the extra costs and risks to business are 
inevitably passed on to the consumers. An essential element of a good investment climate is a sound, 
transparent regulatory regime and an effective competition policy framework is an important component 
of a good overall regulatory environment.   
 
Fair competition is important for development.  A good business regulatory regime matters.    And 
competition policy has a role to play, in helping to establish and maintain a level playing field. Yet, we all 
know that anti-competitive practices abound - to the detriment of many. In recent years, we have come to 
appreciate two things: 
 
First:  the public sector-- government, and its agencies -- is as much to blame for this as are private 
businesses and individuals. There are many policies, laws, regulations and administrative practices that 
thwart fair competition, at both the national and sub-national levels; and 
 
Second:  in order to get to grips with the problem we have to recognise that it is not just technical, legal or 
economic matters that have to be addressed, but there are wider - and sometimes fundamental - 
institutional, political economy considerations that matter just as much. In some cases, strong vested 
interests have to be overcome - whether commercial, institutional or private individuals. In recent times, 
DFID has been paying increasing attention to these sorts of governance issues. In 2006, DFID published 
a third White Paper - on the theme of “Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the 
Poor”. This White Paper emphasises the three pillars of Public Capability, Accountability and 
Responsiveness. It also highlights the role of vested interests in blocking reforms and holding back 
development. These governance concepts apply to the regulatory and competition policy worlds, just as 
much as they do in other areas.  
 
In recognition of the above two themes, DFID has been developing a ‘Competition Assessment 
Framework’ (CAF). This will help senior policy makers with responsibility for economic and competition 
issues in developing countries, to identity and address anti-competitive arrangements and practices in both 
the private and public spheres; and to recognise governance issues as well as more technocratic ones. The 
CAF should also be of interest to others - including consumer-oriented NGOs like CUTS - who are 
concerned about the impact of anti-competitive practices.  
  
CUTS have been doing a lot of good competition advocacy work in recent years, not only in India but 
elsewhere in Asia and in Africa. DFID has been supporting a number of their larger programmes, 
especially the ‘7Up’ ones and would continue to support several other regulatory reform and competition 
policy programmes in Africa and Asia, often in partnership with the World Bank and other bilateral 




2. Dr C. Rangarajan, Chairman, Economic Advisory Council to Prime Minister of India 
The economic landscape is undergoing significant changes in developing countries. It may be recalled that 
in the 1950s and 1960s, the dominant view in the literature on development economics was that the 
government has an important role to play and that it should undertake activities that would compensate 
for “market failure”. 
 
In the past, developing economies were characterised by significant government involvement marked by 
dominance of large state-owned enterprises. Many of these countries embarked on the path of economic 
reforms during 1980s and 1990s by shifting to market-driven economic policies.  
 
In any economic system, state can play many roles of which three can be identified as important.  
• as a producer of marketable goods and services,  
• as a regulator of the system, and  
• as a supplier of “public goods” and “merit goods” like primary education and public health.  
 
The decreasing role of state as a producer of marketable goods and services and the increasing role of 
market in such areas simultaneously enhances the role of state as a “regulator” and “facilitator”. The 
regulatory role comes into play in order to maintain competitive conditions in the market and to ensure 
that every one follows the basic rules of the game. 
 
Since the advent of economic reforms in developing economies, there have been considerable changes in 
their policy arena, with increased reliance on market forces. Along with policy changes, many of these 
economies have adopted competition laws as a follow up to their market oriented economic reforms. 
 
While competition authorities exist to maintain competition, regulatory authorities for various sectors have 
also come to occupy an important place. Such regulatory authorities are established in sectors where 
competitive markets cannot exist. In such a situations, regulatory authorities seek to mimic competitive 
outcomes to the extent possible.  
 
Apart from political interference, the existence of large number of sectoral regulators together with a 
competition authority may raise issue of overlap and friction. The ideal solution could be to legislate clear 
mandates for regulators and the competition authority. It is best to leave the determination of competitive 
principles to competition authorities. Across sectors, some common principles of competition must 
prevail. 
 
Establishment of competition authority by itself does not resolve all problems relating to the creation of 
competitive conditions. Unless there is a strong political will, even the competition authority may not be 
able to function effectively. However, in order that competition may prevail, competition laws need to be 
supplemented by an appropriate competition policy, which will ensure a full play of competitive forces.   
 
Efficiency is associated with competition. In order to maintain competitive conditions, three things are 
needed. First, there should be appropriate competition laws to prevent market abuse. This is preventive in 
character. Second this must be supplemented by competition policy, which will ensure that all government 
policies tend to promote competition. This has a positive dimension. Third, sectoral regulation becomes 
important in areas where there are natural monopolies. Under such circumstances, it is necessary to 
establish appropriate relationship between sectoral regulators and the competition authority. The political 
economy constraints need to be taken into account while framing competition laws and more importantly 
in drafting competition policy.  
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3. Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi, Secretary-General of UNCTAD 
The political economy of regulation has been thoroughly dealt with in recent literature from both the 
theoretical and empirical standpoints. In essence, economists claim that market failures can be corrected 
simply by assuming the existence of total welfare maximization institutional mechanism.  
 
Theoretical conclusions therefore postulate that good regulatory mechanisms and a favourable 
international environment are critical ingredients for the provision of essential services. This is, for 
instance, in the case of water and sanitation, education, health care, telecommunications, transport and 
other services that are primary determinants of progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. 
 
But reality is unfortunately more complicated. In reality, policy makers are faced with many constraints in 
their efforts to address market failures and maximize national welfare. In reality, the sheer magnitude of 
regulatory challenges facing developing countries is overwhelming.  
 
On water and sanitation, despite renewed international commitments and efforts, half the population in 
developing countries still lacks access to improved sanitation. If current trends persist, this MDG objective 
will most likely not be met by 2015 in sub-Saharan Africa, Southern Asia, Oceania and Asian members of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States. In sub-Saharan Africa, only 56% of the population has access 
to safe drinking water. Furthermore, some 100 million children around the world have no access to 
primary school education.  
 
These numbers show that there is still a huge gap to be addressed when it comes to the political economy 
constraints of regulation. Bridging this gap between theoretical predictions and harsh realities on the 
ground in developing countries is one of the major tasks.  
 
There is no uniform prescription or recipe that would work in all countries. But the international 
community has already endorsed some guiding principles. First and foremost, it is for each government to 
evaluate the trade-offs between the benefits of international rules and the constraints posed by the loss of 
policy flexibility at national level. This is particularly important for developing countries as they become 
bigger global players and have to balance national policy space and international disciplines and 
commitments. 
 
UNCTAD helps developing countries on the negotiations on domestic regulation in order to ensure that 
their developmental and institutional needs are adequately reflected in any disciplines that might be 
adopted. Going back to the alarming figures, this means that in all essential services sectors, strong 
national leadership to formulate and implement country strategies must be backed by international donor 
assistance. 
 
Other opportunities arise in the field of competition policy, an area where UNCTAD has been at the 
forefront of international debate since the 1970s. The activities have helped bring about the current 
situation, whereby most developing countries and their regional groupings have passed the stage of 
contemplating whether or not they want to have a competition or regulatory law. Instead, they are now at 
the stage of working out how to structure their laws or, if they already have laws, how best to enforce 
them, given the constraints. 
 
Based on our experience, the process of adoption and effective implementation of competition and 
consumer protection legislation is by no means an easy task. As the theme of this symposium clearly 
suggests, there are many political economy considerations at stake. And indeed, having the "political will" 
to move forward with market-oriented reforms does play a crucial role. Yet as the background documents 
for this meeting suggest, political will is not created in a vacuum. International efforts, including 
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UNCTAD's own advocacy work of the past decades, do make a difference. As a result of these efforts, 
some countries have adopted or amended competition laws, while others are making significant progress 
in their implementation record. 
 
But aside from the domestic and international levels, there is another dimension to political economy 
constraints: the regional dimension. By joining forces at the regional level, developing countries have an 
additional opportunity to improve their regulatory regimes.  
 
4. Dr Nitin Desai, Former Under Secretary General, UN 
The ambitious growth goals that India has set in the past 4-5 years and achieved them is not because of the 
accumulation factors but because of the increase in productivity. 
 
It is because of the continuous effort of technological dynamism and a competitive environment in all key 
sectors of economies and the growth that we have achieved is mainly because of the sharpness of the edge 
of competition in many crucial sectors. In the absence of a sound competition policy it will be difficult to 
sustain that sort of growth over a long period of time. The government has started to revisit the policies 
for private sector for better regulation and competitive environment and the main reason behind this is the 
changes that took place in earlier years  
 
There exist the two models one is the business-friendly model in which the government promotes 
preferred activities in a variety of ways and would like to keep a cozy relationship with the industry. The 
other model is the market-friendly model where the government’s role is that of establishing rules and to 
establish competitive environment with relevant freedom of entry and exit.  
 
There is virtually no role for competition authority to play in a business friendly model, as the government 
would like to play god here and not promote a competitive environment. It is essential that the whole idea 
of competition culture is to move onto a market friendly environment.  
 
On the issue of political economy, it is usually seen in many developing countries that the bureaucrats do 
not want deregulation to happen. In many federal countries there may be non-discriminatory political 
environment at national level but at the state level there may be a business friendly environment. 
 
Business by and large is happy with the competition in their own industry but they would like to see more 
competition among their supplier industries. Business group will always be extremely reluctant for  
competition in market for corporate control and it is the consumer that suffers most. 
 
It is very important for a better economic growth and completive environment and also to safeguard the 




1. Bimal Jalan, Former Governor, Reserve Bank of India 
Mr. Jalan underscored the important distinction between regulation and control and hoped that the former 
does not degenerate into the latter.  In this spirit, his recommendation was that regulation should be the 
exception and not the rule.  Another attribute of good regulation is accountability and transparency of the 
regulator and in this context Dr. Jalan gave the example of RBI where certain standards of disclosure are 
prescribed for RBI. Similarly he appreciated the role that Right to Information Act (RTI) in India might 
play in enhancing transparency and therefore accountability of regulators and the process. 
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He also advised creation of a set of universally accepted standards for regulators across different sectors 
along the lines of Basel norms created by the Bank of International Settlements, an international 
organisation that fosters international monetary and financial cooperation and serves as a bank for central 
banks. 
 
2. Evan Due, IDRC 
The last two days have been very interesting and now the time has come where we would need to think 
forward, future activities, forward looking. This particular project deals with political economy of 
regulatory regimes, that it self sets the project apart and there is a real gap, which needs to be filled by 
empirical research. However, there is a need to undertake research and disseminate the findings, but there 
is also the need to engage actively with the concerned officials in the political arena. The involvement of 
CUTS is beneficial as the findings of the project would be shared with other NGOs and also used in 
advocacy work.  
 
There is a need for greater transparency in the working of the agencies, as reflected in some of the papers, 
greater accountability of the regulatory agencies, by having access to information. There is a need for 
capacity building of the members of the regulatory agencies; researchers and that would help them in 
engaging with regulatory agencies in developing countries. There is also a need for capacity building of 
media, which is very important.  
 
Another important aspect that could be derived from the papers is the issue about public interest. The 
papers covered the element of public interest and vested interest. It is a very important element of this 
particular work.  
 
The next step is to undertake more engaging research with the policy makers and the communities. It also 
means to take stock from what we have heard today and taking stock of the material available outside the 
research and mapping the way forward, what are the implications of policy makers.  
 
Thus to end, this project should enable consumers to have greater choices, greater access to information, 
access to make those choices and this should be the goal of further work. 
 
  
3. Simon Evenett, University of St.Gallen 
The meeting began with a fantastic opening session with the UNCTAD Secretary General, including 
others luminaries coming to encourage us to undertake this particular research project and their comments 
were very inspiring as we went forward.  
 
We had about 20 presentations over the last day and a half and keeping in mind the number of discussants 
and the presenters, it was tough keeping in mind the time restrictions to indulge in detailed discussions 
over each of the paper. Thus one thing that we should keep in mind to maximise benefits from such kinds 
of meetings in near future is to give the presenters some more time to explain their findings.  
 
One important aspect of the meeting was the discussion on issues concerning countries across the globe; 
we had roughly in depth discussions over at least 12 countries. This proved to be very beneficial and the 
project is very strong in representing South Asia and Africa. However, keeping in mind the theme of the 
said project, we missed having representation from Latin America and East Asia, which could have been a 
value addition to the whole project. Some case studies from these regions would have been helpful in 
shedding some lights on the importance of economic political dimensions.  
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One important questions, we all can ask ourselves is that why does the world needs another edited volume 
on Regulation in Developing Countries, what’s the value edition? Thus to prove the need for the said 
edited volume, we would need to work on the following three things: 
 
1. We need to think about the regulatory agencies, competition agencies and the discretion and 
choices they have. Too much of the discussion, which we had over the last two days, has emphasised on 
political economy constraints, that are bearing down on constraining or frustrating the workings of these 
agencies. But we seem to forget, that agencies that often have some discretion and the question is, how do 
they use that or how can they use that in different types of political context? How do regulatory agencies 
facing political economy constraints in their own homes use external or international standards to enhance 
their position at homes or to defend themselves by saying that we are emulating international standards? 
How do the domestic regulatory agencies use external groups, external advisors to help them in enhancing 
their position domestically? How do they join such external groups, which can enhance their position? 
How do they use external assistance as provided to them, through capacity building, etc? For example, 
certain competition agencies join the ICN to argue at home that their regulations need to be brought in 
line with international standards. Thus one area, where we can create uniqueness about this project, is to 
see the discretion the agencies have and how can they creatively use them.  
 
2. We need to take quantifications of these political economy considerations much more seriously. 
We need to look at quantifications more narrowly? We need to document many other ways in which 
political economy factors impinge upon the performance of agencies and then move a step forward to 
understand how activities of those agencies or performances are influenced by political economy factors.  
 
3. We need to think more deeply as to what are the real implications for policy making here. Many 
of the studies usefully pointed out the constraints that might arise in a political process or in relationships 
(informal or formal) between regulators and political masters. But one thing that was missing in most of 
the papers was the number of different policy options. We ought to be thinking about how can we rank 
different kind of policy options, policy choices and what lessons we can learn. The importance of thinking 
about different policy choices is highlighted by the following example, i.e. if one does not think that 
independence is not the recipe for a successful regulatory agency than what is? Thus we would need to 
analyse the different alternatives?  
 
When we talk about country specifity matters i.e. One Size Does Not Fit All’, then we need develop 
various sets of policy recommendations that takes account of national circumstances.  
 
4. Dr. Frederic Jenny, Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court of France) 
There was particularly an original angle to this conference, was that we were discussing the political 
economy of regulation. Thus one question that arises here is that where do those problems come from or 
where do those organisations i.e. regulators come from? They come from market-oriented reforms of the 
last 15 years, de-regulation, etc. Then a further question that comes to mind is that why did we engage into 
this movement at a world wide level. One reason was higher trust in market mechanism to promote 
efficiency and growth and we were instructed by the failures of economies in 70s and 80s. Thus to draw 
economic lessons from the failures of the market in 70s and 80s i.e. de-regulation movement was one part 
of the reason, for us to undertake market oriented reforms. The second part was more something like 
economic democracy or desire to promote economic democracy, where states were seen as dominant and 
were behaving in a strategic way and unfair way to the rest of the society.  
 
The future research on this area should focus on quality aspects of regulation and regulatory regimes in 
developing countries.  Future work could inter alia address questions such as:  
• Do regulators do what they are supposed to do?  
• Whether what they are supposed to do is right?   
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• Perceived successes and failures could be studied as cases to learn from such experiences.   
  
We started from  poor market reforms, which is a crucial public policy instrument in 1990s not only in the 
developing countries but in many developed countries as well. During 90s very important changes took 
place in developing countries for two main reasons: first, the desire and hope that the efficiency of 
production system increases which in turn promotes economic growth and second, is the desire to prevent 
the expectation of weak economic actors such as the small developing countries, small or medium size 
firms, small farmers or the consumers. For those dreams to be realized, market oriented reforms were 
necessary but not sufficient. Some kind of re-regulation is required so that the market works to the benefit 
of everyone.  
 
The market reforms agenda in developing countries and in some developed countries is tough to deal with. 
First thing it requires is the ‘political will’ which is often most difficult part of it even though the changes 
have been undertaken but not always as systematic and comprehensive and often with compromises.  
 
Political will is important but more important is that some kind of regulatory regimes need to be 
established to function effectively to tackle issues such as inconsistency, bad institutional design, lack of 
political will etc. 
 
The competition authorities after 15 years tend to be very isolated in many countries, as they do not have 
the full political support they deserve to be more effective. One of the main reasons behind is the political 
support is usually transferred into other channels.  
 
In a question thrown to economists, he asked whether goal of efficiency and consistency congruent with 
the political goal of economic growth in developing countries or are those two different policies 
addressing two different political issues.  
 
The mere adoption of competition and regulatory laws is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for it to 
be a part of the market reform and poverty reduction agenda. Implementation is equally important. 
Fulfilling development objective while implementing competition and regulatory laws in developing 
countries is not an easy task. This requires understanding and knowledge of how to do it, which is 
presently absent.  
 
5. William Kingsmill, DFID 
Poverty reduction is one of DFID’s major objectives.  It is, in fact, one of the main reasons for the 
organisation’s existence. 
 
The only significant route to poverty reduction is robust growth in which poor people participate.  The 
jargon we use is ‘shared growth’ or ‘inclusive growth’ How does growth happen?  It is partly the result of 
capital accumulation and investment, but, more importantly, it is about productivity.  Peoples’ livelihood 
will improve only if productivity improves.  
 
What is it that brings about an improvement in productivity?   The main answer is that it is competition, 
which is the fundamental mechanism or the driver of growth.  If markets are not competitive, and if the 
state’s policies do not foster competition, growth and development will fall well below what could be 
achieved.  
 
It is important that poor people are able to participate in the growth process, and competition policy has 
an important role to play in this.   Competition policy should seek to remove the causes of market failure.  
Markets may fail for a variety of reasons, but we must recognise the importance of the political economy 
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dimension.     The relationships between governments, markets and citizens can be complex, and we need 
to be pragmatic about how we move forward, to be sure that we are improving the world.  
 
Another very important principle that has been referred to in this Symposium is that basic economic 
theory tells us that there can be failures of collective action.   Civil society organizations like CUTS fill an 
important need when they give voice to the citizens, the consumers and society in this complex world.   
Through the collective efforts of civil society organizations,  the concerns of society are voiced.    
 
Technological advance and change is evident almost everywhere in the world today.   Many of the 
regulatory issues that arise, for example in the telecommunications sector, reflect the revolutionary changes 
that are taking place in technology.   Technological change will often alter the organizational structure of 
an industry, and the nature of monopolistic or oligopolistic practices in it.   We need to be ready to adapt 
to such changes in a technology driven sector.  
 
Another issue to be taken care of is climate change.  The wide range of activities based on the need to 
react positively to climate change will constitute a huge industry in the future.  We need to consider 
carefully how we are prepared to regulate our society better to cope with the whole issue of climate 
change.  
 
One of the themes of the British Government’s most recent White Paper on international development, 
published last year, was that the challenge for the immediate future for all of us is to look at how we can 
help governments around the world become more capable, more accountable and more responsive to 
deliver the things that only government can deliver.   It has emerged clearly at this Symposium, that it is 
civil society organizations, with their convening power and ability to deliver collective actions, that are 







Symposium Evaluation Report 
 
Summary 
An evaluation of the deliberations, emerging issues, recommendations and outcomes of the Research 
Symposium was important. With the twin objective of eliciting participant’s views on the issues addressed 
during the symposium and conducting an exercise in self-evaluation to know as to where we at CUTS have 
stood, a feedback survey was conducted. 
 
The survey was undertaken through a Symposium Evaluation Form, divided into four parts: Symposium 
Quality, Quality of Sessions, Views about CDRF Programme and General feedback about Event Management. All the 
sessions at the symposium were well attended and evaluation is based on the overall responses provided by 
the participants through the duly filled feedback evaluation form.  
 
• Part I of the feedback evaluation form, dealt with the evaluation of the symposium and essentially 
elicited responses on: the quality of the event, the contribution of the symposium to the field of 
political economy of competition and regulatory regimes in developing countries. Majority of the 
responses received indicated that the contribution made by the programme to the field of political 
economy of competition and regulatory regimes has been good. The symposium has been successful in 
stimulating the developing world on the subject of political economy of competition and regulatory 
regimes. High percentage of the participants’ responses, rating the quality of discussions and 
deliberations held as being good or excellent is in conformity with the quality (rating) of the 
symposium. This indicates that the symposium provided an interactive platform for all participants to 
present and exchange their ideas on the given subject. 
 
• Part II of the feedback evaluation form, dealt with evaluating the sessions in terms of the quality of 
papers presented The feedback in all the six sessions reflects that the quality of majority of the papers 
are either good or excellent.  
 
• Part III of the feedback evaluation form, aimed at drawing out ideas and thoughts of participants 
about CDRF project. In response to whether the research programme provided a platform to research 
community from the developing world to showcase their research and facilitate peer review of their 
work by renowned experts, most of the participants opined that it indeed offered a good platform to 
researchers from developing world to share their research and experiences on the issues. To sum, the 
responses reflecting CDRF programme being a unique initiative is overwhelming and motivating. 
 
• In response to, whether the CDRF programme generated good substantive knowledge for better 
implementation of competition and regulatory regimes in developing countries, more than half of the 
participants opinions were affirmative, while some found the knowledge generated as being excellent. 
Though, few participants found the information generated as being only satisfactory. 
 
• Part IV of the feedback evaluation form, was general in nature and aimed at eliciting response from 
participants on overall management of the symposium. Majority of the people found their attendance 






In principle, evaluation is the first step towards improvement. It helps provide vital statistical information 
about what is missing – an information, which is crucial and which forms a base for the effectiveness of all 
future events and activities of an organisation. Evaluation is not all about taking a snapshot of outcomes at 
the end of a programme to measure its success or failure. Instead, it is a continuous process of learning, 
improving and performing efficiently. It was with this purpose that an Evaluation of the Symposium 
organised as part of a research programme entitled “Competition, Regulation and Development Research Forum” 




On March 22-24, 2007 CUTS International organised an International Research Symposium titled “Political 
Economy Constraints in Regulatory Regimes in Developing Countries” as part of the research programme entitled 
CDRF. CUTS International has undertaken this programme to stimulate research and deliberation on 
competition and regulatory implementation issues in developing countries.  
 
Dignitaries from around the globe, who adorned the symposium with their presence included Dr Supachai 
Panitchpakdi, Secretary General, UNCTAD, Dr C Rangarajan, Chairman, Economic Advisory Council to 
the Prime Minister of India, Dr Fredric Jenny, Judge French Supreme Court; Bimal Jalan, MP and Former 
Governor of Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Dr Nitin Desai, Former Under Secretary, UN, Roger Nellist, 




The survey was conducted through a Symposium Evaluation Form, divided into four parts: each carrying 
questions specifically eliciting responses about symposium quality, quality of sessions, views about CDRF 
programme and general feedback about event management. The forms were distributed during the 
symposium along with other conference materials and the duly filled in forms were subsequently collected 
at the end of the symposium. A total of 17 completed forms were received and this evaluation is based on 
the overall responses provided. One wishes that more forms were handed over, but that did not happen. 
Therefore the responses may not reflect the whole picture. However, from personal discussions and brief 
remarks made on the sidelines, the results can be assumed to be fairly reflective of the whole. The term 
“Participant” used in this report refers only to those who submitted the feedback forms rather than the 
total number of attendants. The figures have been designed and prepared based on an in-depth analysis of 















Part I: Symposium Evaluation 
The Evaluation Form was divided into four parts. Part I deals with the evaluation of the symposium and 
essentially elicited responses on: the quality of the event, the contribution of the symposium to the field of 
political economy of competition and regulatory regimes in developing countries; the recommendations 
emerging from the symposium in terms of their usefulness in understanding issues regarding the 
implementation of competition and regulatory regimes in developing countries; the quality of discussions 
held in terms of their interactiveness; and whether the programme was well designed or not. Figure 1 
portrays an idea about the responses received.  
 
















 It is evident from Figure 1, that in response to the item that measured quality of the symposium 
(rating of the symposium), majority of the participants i.e. 64.7 percent found the symposium as 
being good, while 35.2 percent of the participants rated the symposium as excellent.  
 
Key Message: Such a healthy response indicating the overall rating of the symposium is indeed a motivation 
booster for the organisation to continue to be innovative and deliver excellence as far as 
performance is concerned. 
 
 While rating the contribution that the symposium made to the field of political economy of 
competition and regulatory regimes in the developing world, as many as 64.7 percent of the 
responses found it to be good, while 23.5 percent of the participants rated the contribution as 
being satisfactory.  
 
 Key Message: That majority of the responses indicating that the contribution made to the field of political 
economy of competition and regulatory regimes has been good, is indicative of the fact that the 
symposium has been successful in stimulating the developing world on the given subject, which was 

















 On the parameter of emerging recommendations, about 68.7 percent of the participants rated it as 
being good, while 29.4 percent found the recommendations as being satisfactory. The rating was 
given in terms of usefulness of the recommendations in understanding issues regarding 
implementation of competition and regulatory regimes in developing countries.  
 
 Key Message: Majority of responses favouring the recommendations emerging as being good is reflective of the fact 
that the CDRF programme has been successful in meeting its objective of creating awareness and 
Poor 1
Unsatisfactory 1
Satisfactory 4 5 1 1
Good 11 11 8 12 6












developing understanding of issues with regard to implementation of competition and regulatory 
regimes in developing countries.  
 
 The highest rating is reflected in the responses on the quality of discussions and exchange of 
knowledge and experiences, as about 70.5 percent of responses rated as being good while  23.5 
percent rated the discussions as excellent. A mere six percent respondents found them as being 
satisfactory.  
 
 Key Message: Overall, 94 percent of the participants’ responses rating quality of discussions and deliberations 
held as being good/excellent is in conformity with the quality (rating) of the symposium. This 
indicates that the symposium provided an interactive platform for all participants to present and 
exchange their ideas on the subject. This is also reflective of the fact that the symposium has been 
able to meet its objective. The only respondent who rated the quality of discussions as being 
satisfactory seems to be unhappy with the time management.  
 
 For any programme to be a success, what is crucial is its design. The final item in this section 
attempts to educe participant’s views on how well the symposium programme was designed. It was 
found that about 47 percent of the respondents rated the programme design as excellent, while 35 
percent rated it as being good. However, 5.8 percent each found it as being either satisfactory, 
unsatisfactory or poor.  
 
Key Message: About 12 percent responses, which rated the programme design as being unsatisfactory or poor, 
were in particular not happy with the time allotted to each presentation. They were of the view 
that the allotted 10 minutes for the presenters was rather short and insufficient to deliberate issues 
in depth. This is an important point for the organisation to bear in that improper time 
management can seriously impair the very purpose of organising such events.  
 
Part II: Sessions Evaluation 
The next section of the feedback form dealt with evaluating the sessions in terms of the quality of papers 
presented. For this the respondents were asked to rate the papers presented in all six sessions on a scale of 
1 to 10, where 1 is equivalent to Poor and 10 is equivalent to Excellent. The papers were rated in terms of 
their content. In all, 20 papers were short-listed under the first phase of the research cycle. In addition to 
these 20 papers there were 2 standalone/independent presentations. Figure 2 provides an analysis of 
participant’s view on the quality of papers (20 papers plus 2 stand-alone presentations) presented during 
the symposium.  
 

















Figure 2 shows that on the whole, 
majority of the papers presented received 
a rating of above 7, on a scale of 1 to 10 
(1 being Poor and 10 excellent). This is 
indicative of the fact that participants 
who submitted their feedbacks found the 
quality of majority of the papers as either 
good or excellent.  
 
Paper I 7.47 7.13 7.67 7.5 6.88 6.79 7.58 7.07
The paper with highest rating is Paper II 
on “Competition and Regulatory 
Institutional Structures in Micro-states: 
Paper II 7.59 7.69 7.67 8.13 7.41 6.71 7.43 6.92
Paper III 7.65 7.44 7.27 7.38
Paper IV 7.38 7.4
Session I Session II Session III Session IV Session V Session VI : 
Electricity





the Case of the Caribbean”, with an average rating of 8.1, presented in Session IV. 
 
 
Part III: Thoughts on CDRF 
The Part III of the Evaluation Form aimed at drawing out ideas and thoughts of participants about CDRF 
project. The section in particular sought to know what the participants in general felt about the CDRF 
programme in terms of its uniqueness, it being a platform facilitating research and whether the symposium 
was able to generate any substantial knowledge in the field of political-economy of competition and 
regulatory regimes. Figure 9 gives an idea about participant’s responses under this category. 
 
                      Figure 9: Thoughts on CDRF (Based on Responses) 
 In response to ‘CDRF being a 
unique initiative’ about 53 percent 
respondents rated it as such that 
seeks to fill the vacuum that exists 
in the research on political economy 
of competition and regulatory 
regimes in developing countries. 
While 47 percent believed that the 
symposium is a good initiative 














A Unique Initiative Platform Facilitating 
Research & Peer Review
Generated Substantive 
Knowledge
Excellent 9 10 4
Good 8 7 11
Satisfactory 2
Unsatisfactory
PoorKey Message: Such response as regards 
CDRF Programme being a unique initiative is 
overwhelming for the organisation and in particular 
is in conformity with the ideas that the organisation had in mind while conceptualising the research programme  
 
 In response to whether the research programme provided a platform to research community from 
 
the developing world to showcase their research and facilitate peer review of their work by 
renowned experts, as many as 58.8 percent of the participants believed that it offered an excellent 
platform while 41.1 percent opined that it indeed offered a good platform to researchers from 
developing world to share their experiences and knowledge on the issue.  
Key Message: One of the objectives we had in our mind while organising the symposium was to set a stage for experts from the 
 developing world to showcase their research on the subject. The response received is indeed in agreement with this objective 
 
 In response that the CDRF programme generated good substantive knowledge for better 
 
implementation of competition and regulatory regimes in developing countries, about 65 percent 
respondents said in affirmative, while 24 percent responses found the knowledge generated as 
being excellent for the purpose. A mere 11 percent found the information generated as being only 
satisfactory (Please see Figure 9).  
Key Message: While undertaking the research programme, an important objective was that the programme must generate substantive 
knowledge on issues of better implementation of competition and regulatory regimes in developing countries. The response from the 
participants is in conjunction with this objective. The reason why about 11 percent of the responses found the knowledge generated as only 
satisfactory in this context could be attributed to the fact that there was time constraint for each presentation to be discussed and 









Part IV: General Feedback 
Figure 10: Source of Information 
The Part IV of the Evaluation Form was 
general in nature and aimed at eliciting 
response from participants on overall 

















Series1 14 1 2 4
Mail Lists Website Surfing Word of Mouth Newsletter Others
 The first item under this section asked 
 
participants the source from where they 
came to know about the symposium.  
 It was found that majority (14) of the 
 
participants came to know about the 
symposium via CUTS mail lists.  
  A few others became aware about the 
 newsletters.  event by website surfing and through CUTS 
 
  There were a few participants who marked “others” as their response to this item. The other sources 
 
included: direction from superiors to attend the event, or became aware of the symposium, while 
present during other events/workshops/seminars hosted by CUTS (Please see Figure 10).   
Key Message: The responses under this section indicates that CUTS mailing list has been an important source for 
d
                          Figure 11:  General Feedback




 Overall the symposium 
 
administration dealt with 
questions like how well were 
the audio/visual equipments 
used, whether CUTS staff 
were helpful and responsive 
and whether information on 
the symposium web page 
was of any use or not. Figure 
11 provides information on 
the responses under this 
section.   
 It was found that about 94 
uipments were either excellent or good, while only six percent 
 
percent of the respondents 
felt that the audio/visual eq















Excellent 10 14 12 7
Good 6 2 5 8












Key Message: That about six percent responses rated the use of audio/visual equipments as being satisfactory is due to the 
fact that a few participants observed that collar mikes could have been a better option rather than fixed mikes. Power outage 
on the last day for a few minutes was also one of the reasons. .  
 
 In response to whether CUTS’ staff was helpful and responsive 82 percent of the respondents 
found them to be excellent, while about 12 percent found them to be good. Only six percent noted 
CUTS’ staff as being satisfactorily helpful and responsive.  
 
 Information on the Symposium web page was found to be very useful by as many as 94 percent of 
the respondents. (44 percent found information on web as excellent and 50 percent found it as 
being good), while six percent felt the web page was satisfactorily informative and useful.  
 
Key Message: That about six percent respondents favoured the information on symposium web page as being satisfactory is 
indicative of the fact that while organising future events, proper coverage of information on the web page in terms of content, 
layout, design and attractiveness should be kept in mind.  
 
 There was a strong consensus among the respondents regarding the attendance at the symposium. 
As many as 71 percent of the respondents believed that their participation/attendance at the 
symposium was excellently worthwhile and was quite fruitful. 
 
 
Suggestions on Issues to be taken up for Future Research Cycles 
A multitude of suggestions were received from respondents regarding various issues that should be taken 
up for future research cycle. These have been categorised under the following headings. 
 
A. Competition and Regulatory Issues 
1. Public interests from a competition law and policy perspective vis-à-vis public interests in 
general 
2. ‘One-size does not fit all’ Concept: From a Competition law and policy perspective with a 
worldwide view 
3. Competition and regulation in different phases of growth with varied country experiences 
4. How to balance between competition and regulation – industry experiences across different 
countries 
5. Are technical and financial assistance bottlenecks for competition and regulatory regimes? 
 
B. Regulatory Issues 
1. How to define autonomy and independence in developing world? 
2. Does the institutional design matter for competition and regulatory regimes? 
3. In view of the fact that the typical sectoral regulator in a developing country is responsible 
from a natural monopoly owned by the state, could the jurisdictional tug of war between 
sectoral regulators and competition agencies be a manifestation of a wider jurisdictional 
definition that exempts state enterprises and state actions from competition law? 
4. How to create more innovative market design (pro-competitive) in infrastructure privatisation? 
(Especially in transport – roads, ports)? 
5. How to achieve effective enforcement of competition and regulatory regimes? 
 
C. Advocacy and Capacity Building Issues 
1. How to ensure stakeholders participation in competition and regulatory regimes? 
2. How to find ways to provide dialogue between competition and regulatory agencies and 
judiciary in developing countries? 
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3. How to measure the effectiveness of advocacy vs. enforcement of competition and regulatory 
agencies? 
4. How to analyse the advocacy experiences of different countries? 
 
D. Other Issues 
1. How to provide economic approach to the judiciary in developing countries? 
2. How to identify the determinants of relative efficiency of various state ERG in India   
3. How to evaluate the contract between donor agency and recipient state, e.g. drinking water? 
4. How to introduce credible (scientific) structured, quantitative method which is also 
“practitioner friendly” to measure priority/effectiveness/performance? (It needs to be able to 
deal with intangibles considering benefits, costs, opportunities, risks. The proposed 
methodology/theory for this is available in “The Analytic Hierarchy/Network Processes” by 













DAY ONE (Thursday, 22nd March) 
 
1800 – 1930  Inaugural Session 
 
1800 – 1810  Welcome by Pradeep S. Mehta, CUTS International, India 
 
1810 – 1820  Observations by 
Roger Nellist, DFID, UK 
 
1820 – 1930 C. Rangarajan, Chairman, Economic Advisory Council to Prime Minister of India 
Frederic Jenny, Judge, French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation), France 
Nitin Desai, Former Under-Secretary General of United Nations, India 
Supachai Panitchpakdi, Secretary General, UNCTAD 
 
1930  Reception and Dinner 
 
 
DAY TWO (Friday, 23rd March) 
 
0730 – 0830 Registration 
 
0900 – 1100  Session I: Political Economy Constraints in Competition and Regulatory Regimes 
 
 Developing countries have been striving to implement market-oriented economic reforms, of 
which competition law and regulatory law are key constituents. However, some countries are still 
struggling to adopt competition laws and regulatory laws, while several others have not been able to 
take steps towards their effective implementation. This session would focus on political-economic 
constraints that affect adoption and effective implementation of competition law and regulatory law 
in developing countries. The discussions would explore measures to integrate and address political 
economy concerns in the design and implementation of regulatory and competition laws in the 
developing world. 
 
Chairs Pierre Jacquet, Agence Francaise de Development, France  





• Tackling the ‘Tyranny of Vested Interests’: Competition Policy as Political Governance 
- Max Everest-Phillips, DFID, UK 
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• Identifying and Overcoming Political Economy and Governance Constraints to the 
Effective Implementation of Competition and Regulatory Laws in Zambia – Thula G 
Kaira, Zambia Competition Commission, Zambia 
• Journey of India’s New Competition Law through a Practitioner’s eye – Pradeep S 
Mehta, CUTS International, India 
 
Discussants  Peter Muchoki Njoroge, Monopolies and Prices Commission, Kenya  
Pranab Bardhan, University of California, Berkley, USA 
Scott Jacobs, Jacobs and Associates, USA 
Thankom Arun, University of Manchester, UK 
  
 
1100 – 1130  Tea/Coffee 
 
1130 – 1330  Session II: Constraints faced by Competition & Regulatory Agencies 
 
Regulatory agencies in developing countries may be susceptible to ‘regulatory capture’ by the 
regulated industry, or to ‘political capture’ by the government. Both types of capture undermine the 
role of a regulator and affect its independent functioning. Potential for capture may be more acute 
for young regulatory agencies, which may not have been able to build up their capacity. Literature 
on institutional design suggests that the regulatory agencies should be independent from any 
influence. The other side of the concern is that independence must go hand in hand with 
accountability and this raises the issue of identifying the right balance between independence and 
accountability. Another challenge faced by regulatory authorities in developing countries relates to 
prioritising cases, given their limited resources and capabilities and the type and nature of cases that 
exist in the developing world. This requires regulatory authorities to select cases very carefully, 
taking into account various factors, particularly the political and economic challenges they face. The 
session would discuss the constraints faced by regulatory authorities in implementing their mandate 
and explore an appropriate strategy for regulators in the developing world 
 
Chairs  Frederic Jenny, French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation), France  
Urmila Bhoola, Competition Tribunal, South Africa 
   
Papers 
• Strategic Priorities of Competition and Regulatory Agencies in Developing Countries - 
Valentina Zoghbi, International Bar Association, UK 
• Conflict between Regulation and Competition Agencies: Lessons from Experience of 
Turkey - Ussal Sahbaz, Turkish Competition Authority, Turkey 
• Aspects of Independence of Regulatory Agencies and Competition Advocacy - Eduardo 
Luiz Machado, Institute for Technological Research, Brazil 
• In the Public Interest: Implementing South Africa’s Competition Policy in the Broader 
South African Policy Context – Trudi Hartzenberg, TRALAC, South Africa 
 
Discussants  Camila Safatle, Secretariat for Economic Law, Brazil 
Mona Yassine, Egyptian Competition Authority, Egypt 
Santiago Roca, Universidad ESAN, Peru 
Sitesh Bhojani, Barrister and Solicitor, Australia 
 
 
1330 - 1430  Lunch 
 
1430 – 1630  Session III: Efficiency and Effectiveness of Competition and Regulatory Agencies 
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 Regulatory agencies face several obstacles while implementing their mandate. These range from the 
environment in which they function, the powers given to them by law, and their ability to 
implement their mandate. These and other factors have varying degree of influence on the 
functioning of regulatory agencies and affect their efficiency and effectiveness. Under the 
circumstances, there is a need to analyse enforcement practices of jurisdictions in the developing 
world to assess how they cope with such obstacles; and to assess the effectiveness of technical 
assistance programmes in enhancing efficiency of regulatory agencies in the developing world. The 
session deals with such issues and identifies appropriate measures to enhance efficiency and 
efficacy of regulatory agencies 
 
Chairs   George Lipimile, Zambia Competition Commission, Zambia 
 
Papers 
• Does Regulation and Institutional Design Matter for Infrastructure 
Sector Performance? - J. Luis Guasch, The World Bank, USA 
• The Role of Regulatory Agencies in Developing Countries: A Game Theoretic 
Approach to the Regulation of Public-Private Contracts – Olivia Jensen, London School 
of Economics, UK 
• Technical Assistance for Law and Economics: An Empirical Analysis in 
Antitrust/Competition Policy - Michael W Nicholson, University of Maryland, USA 
• A Quantitative Evaluation of Effectiveness and Efficacy of Competition Policies across 
Countries – Serdar Dalkir, Principal, Microeconomic Consulting and Research Associates, Inc. 
(MiCRA), USA 
 
Discussants  Allan Asher, Energywatch, UK  
Eleanor Fox, New York University School of Law, USA 
Joseph Seon Hur, Yoon Yang Kim Shin & Yu, S. Korea 
Simon Evenett, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland  
 
1630 – 1645 Tea/Coffee 
 
1645 – 1800  Session IV: Competition and Regulatory Regimes in Small Economies 
 
 The liberalisation and privatisation movement which started in the UK and New Zealand in the 
1980s was intended to remove detailed government control from otherwise competitive markets. In 
promoting reform of infrastructure industries, country institutions and sector governance play an 
important role. Most reforming developed and larger developing countries have tended to adopt 
USA or UK institutional frameworks, especially for the management of competition matters and 
the regulation of utility industries. These governance structures are now being called in to question, 
particularly as to their suitability for small developing countries, where problems of economies scale 
make it difficult to finance and sustain several agencies. This session discusses the institutional 
problem of implementing competition and regulatory regimes in small economies and explores 
appropriate solutions 
 
Chair  Nitin Desai, Former Under-Secretary General of United Nations, India  
  
Papers 
• Competition Policy In Small Jurisdictions - Lino Briguglio, University of Malta 
• Competition and Regulatory Institutional Structures in Micro-states: the Case of the 
Caribbean - Cezley Sampson, Regulatory Governance Adviser to the Government of Jamaica 
 
Discussants  Colin Kirkpatrick, University of Manchester, UK 
Michal S. Gal, University of Haifa, Israel 
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Pierre Jacquet, Agence Francaise de Development, France 
 
 
DAY THREE (Saturday, 24th March) Country/Sectoral Case Studies 
 
0900 – 1100  Session V: Experiences from Different Countries 
 
The session would discuss country experiences in implementing competition and regulatory 
regimes with a focus on institutional issues. The case study on Kenya discusses the performance of 
regulatory regime in the country in the context of its peculiar economic and social problems and 
institutional characteristics and examines institutional issues in the effectiveness of competition and 
regulatory regimes. The case study on Fiji, India and Belgium discuss issues relating to regulatory 
autonomy and accountability and their impact on regulatory efficacy in the countries. The study on 
Belgium shows how the country is batting with such problems and brings out useful lessons for 
developing countries that too are facing similar problem. The case study of Namibia discusses the 
inter-relationship between competition policy and other government policies and shows how lack 
of recognition of this inter-relationship serves as an impediment to effective implementation of 
competition policy. The case study on Turkey studies the interaction between competition authority 
and sector regulators and shows the impact of this institutional tension in promoting competition 
in these industries. The session would discuss these issues and identify appropriate strategy to 
ensure effective implementation of competition and regulatory regimes. 
 
Chairs  Pranab Bardhan, University of California, Berkley, USA 
Suman Bery, National Council of Applied Economics & Research, India 
 
Papers 
• Institutions and the Effectiveness of Competition Policy and Regulatory Regime in 
Kenya - Norman Litigu Shitote, Kenya 
• The Tripod of Independence, Expertise and Accountability of A Regulator - An 
Analysis Of The Indian Competition Law – S Chakravarthy, Adviser, Competition Policy 
and Law, India 
• Credibility and Independence in Belgian Competition and Regulatory Policies - Frank 
Naert, Hogeschool Gent, Belgium 
 
 
Discussants  Cassey Lee, Nottingham University Business School, Malaysia 
John Preston, DFID, UK 
Marwan Kardoosh, Jordan Centre for Public Policy Research & Dialogue, Jordan 
   
 
1100 – 1130 Tea/Coffee 
 
1130 – 1330  Session VI: Sectoral Case Studies (combined session) 
 
Political Economy of 







Political Economy of 
Regulation in Telecom Sector 
 
(III) 
 Electricity sector in India is in the 
concurrent list of the Constitution; 
hence both federal and provincial 
governments are responsible for its 
development. Separate regulatory 
bodies have been set up at the 
Financial market does not itself 
function efficiently without some 
regulations. The session would 
discuss relevant aspects of 
competition and regulation issues in 
the banking sector in South Asian 
The session would discuss issues 
relating to implementation of 
regulatory reforms in the telecom 
sector in developing countries: 
problems face by governments in 
dealing with divestiture/privatisation 
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federal as well as at provincial levels. 
The session would discuss 
constraints faced in introducing 
competition and implementing 
regulatory regime in Electricity 
Sector in India including: analysing 
different possibilities of introducing 
retail competition in Indian 
electricity and problems and 
prospects that might be 
encountered; and assessing the 
nature of regulatory capabilities at 
the Federal and State regulatory 
commissions 
countries. The session would also 
discuss whether government 
ownership is essential for proper 
regulation of financial sector. 
process when faced with large multi 
national companies; problems 
encountered by newly established 
regulators in regulating the 
incumbent state-owned service 
provider; regulatory capture; 
intervention by line ministry. The 
discussion focuses on experiences of 
Uganda, Jamaica and India. 
Chair   
A K Basu, Central Electricity 
Regulatory Commission, India 
Chairs  
D R Mehta, Former Chairman, 
Securities and Exchange Board of 
India, India 
Chairs   
B K Zutshi, Former Deputy 
Chairman, Telecom Regulatory 
Authority of India, India 
 Competitive Electricity 
Markets in India: A 
Regulatory Challenge  - 
Devendra Kodwani, The Open 
University Business School, UK 
 Introducing Competition in the 
Indian Electricity: Is Micro-
Privatisation a Possible Way? – 




• Regulation, Corporate 
Governance and the Banking 
Sector - A Political Economy 
perspective from Bangladesh – 
Thankom Arun, University of 
Manchester, UK 
• Regulation, Competition & 
Government Ownership:  A case 
study of Banking Sector in India 
– M K Datar, IDBI Bank, India  
 
• Reforming and Privatising the 
Telecommunications Sector in 
Jamaica: Experiences of a Small 
Developing Country - Cezley 
Sampson, Regulatory 
Governance Adviser to the 
Government of Jamaica 
• The Political Economy of 
Telecom Regulation in India – 
Rajat Kathuria, Professor of 
Economics, International 
Management Institute, India 
Discussants   
• Anton Eberhard, University of 
Cape Town, South Africa 
• Ashley Brown, Harvard 
Electricity Policy Group, 
Harvard University, USA 
• Steve Thomas, Public Services 




• Ajay Shah, Former Consultant, 
Ministry of Finance, India 
 
Discussants   
• Malathy K John, Institute of 
Policy Studies, Sri Lanka  
• Mahesh Uppal, 
Telecommunications & 
Computer Information System, 
India  
• S L Rao, Institute for Social and 




1330 – 1430 Lunch 
 
1430 – 1700 Closing Session:   
 
1430 – 1500 Presentation by Rapporteurs  
Ajay Shah, Former Consultant, Ministry of Finance, India 
Rajat Kathuria, Professor, Institute of Management Development, India 
Simon Evenett, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland 
 
1500 – 1600 Floor Discussion on Future Research Agenda 
 36
 
1600 – 1645 Keynote addresses by 
Bimal Jalan, Member of Parliament, India 
Frederic Jenny, Judge, French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation), France 
 
1645 – 1700 Closing Remarks by  
Evan Due, IDRC, Singapore 
William Kingsmill, DFID, UK 
Pradeep S Mehta 
 



































Proceedings of Project Advisory Committee meeting 
 
The CDRF Project Advisory Committee Meeting was organised to inform the members about the 
progress made so far of the first research cycle and discuss issues for second research cycle of the CDRF 
project. Given below is the summary of the proceedings: 
  
1. Manish Agarwal gave a brief about the background of the CDRF project and progress made as on 
date. He mentioned that twenty-two good quality research papers have been finalised for the first 
cycle of the project. Deliberations at the symposium would further help in identifying the research 
issues and themes for developing countries in the context of implementation of competition and 
regulatory regimes. Further he mentioned, that a research volume comprising of the said research 
papers, would be published in June 2007. 
  
2. Mehta mentioned that there is a proposal to create a working group on ‘Political Economy of 
Competition and Regulation’. The objective is to promote the main findings of the research cycle. 
He also stated that as part of the outreach activities, policy briefs would be drafted highlighting key 
issues and recommendations emerging out of the final papers. The policy briefs would be 
distributed to enable better understanding of issues related to better implementation of 
competition and regulatory regimes in developing countries.  The distribution of policy briefs will 
utilise the extensive CUTS networks as well as other media.   
 
3. Fredric Jenny congratulated CUTS for taking the first ever initiative to organise a symposium to 
deliberate on political economy aspects of competition and regulatory regimes. He emphasised that 
further research should focus on quality aspects of regulation and regulatory regimes in developing 
countries.  Future work could inter alia address questions such as:  
i) What is the purpose of regulation? 
ii) Do regulators do what they are supposed to do?  
iii) Whether what they are supposed to do is right?  
iv) How do they perform? 
v) Perceived successes and failures could be studied as cases to learn from such 
experiences.   
  
4. Cezley Sampson highlighted the political economy aspects of regulators and regulation and 
suggested that studies in the domain of regulatory outcomes i.e. what is the value of regulators 
work to the political economy or whether they are merely another bureaucratic process, needs to 
be analysed. There is a need to undertake Regulatory Impact Analysis to assess the effectiveness of 
regulators in certain sectors.  
 
5. Pranab Bardhan suggested that second cycle should give emphasis on analysing deeper political 
economy issues, including the nature of entrenched vested interest.  He recommended empirical 
studies at the ground level/micro level should be taken up. 
 
6. Thankom Arun and Ajay Shah had a few comments on the financial sector regulation in India. 
Ajay questioned the intrusive role of financial sector regulation, while Arun suggested that research 
in this area presented at the symposium includes both qualitative and quantitative dimensions. Ajay 
also questioned the basic goal behind the establishment of a regulator and how effective was the 
implementation. S. L. Rao suggested a study on regulation of the Indian electricity sector, especially 
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leadership related issues.  However it was stressed in the meeting by Mehta that since this is an 
international project, diversity in sector and country selection is crucial in meeting its goals. 
 
7. William Kingsmill pointed out that Competition Policy and Regulatory Policy are two separate 
issues and questioned the prudence of combining these while investigating political economy 
aspects.  In his response, Mehta clarified, that the purpose of the project is to look into the political 
economy aspects and that the emphasis is on institutional issues. In both cases these are common. 
 
8. Evan Due suggested that future research should focus on probing the diversity in the patterns 
during evolution of the political economy of competition and regulatory regimes across select 
countries. 
 
9. Eleanor Fox suggested that for the IInd cycle, we should concentrate on massive failures and try to 
get to the root of why the massive failures occur and as the next step, how to counteract the 
problem. We might select one regulatory agency, the head of which is appears to be an 
“independent” expert but nonetheless could not do the job. The researchers might approach the 
problem with a list of hypothesis, factors and questions, such as,  
 
• how old is the agency,  
• how were the chairman and the commissioners chosen,  
• how long are the terms, turnover etc,  
• what level of funding and support,  
• what are the mandates of the agency and how do they balance tensions,  
• what moral/political support is offered by the government,  
• does the agency benchmark,  
• problems of corruption, etc.  
  
10. Drawing out key messages from the above discussion: 
 
• CDRF being an international project, diversity in sector and country selection is crucial in meeting 
its goals. It cannot be an Indo-centric project. 
• Creating a working group on ‘Political Economy of Competition and Regulation’ to promote the 
main findings of the research cycle. 
• Second cycle should give emphasis on analysing deeper political economy issues 
• Future research should focus on probing the diverse pattern in evolution of the political economy 
of competition and regulatory regimes across select countries 
• Undertake further research to derive lessons from Regulatory Failures.  
 
11. In addition, given below are broad research areas for second cycle derived from discussions 
between the CDRF team members: 
 
• Resolving Conflicts between Competition and Regulatory Authorities 
• Addressing Conflicting Objectives of different Stakeholders for better implementation of 
Competition and Regulatory Regimes 
• Protection of Public Interest vis-à-vis Promotion of Efficient Markets 
• Does the quality of regulation matter? 
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12. While the research in the first three will follow the same methodology as in 1st cycle, the last (Does 
the Quality of Regulation matter) would need to be done by CUTS itself through an international 
team. Following key questions could be the starting point for research: 
• What is the purpose of regulation? 
• Do the regulators do what they are supposed to do?  
• Whether what they are supposed to do is right?  
• How do they perform? 
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